Duke Ellington's Foreign Royalties Claim Dismissed Under Plain Language Of 1961 Contract

Ellington v. EMI Music Inc., 651558/2010, NYLJ 1202519466664 (printed Oct. 21, 2011), at *1 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. decided Oct. 2011).

This is action for breach of a songwriter royalty agreement, fraud, and a declaratory judgment. Defendant EMI moved to dismiss the complaint.

Plaintiff Paul M. Ellington, the heir and grandson of the legendary jazz composer and performer Edward Kennedy "Duke" Ellington, sought to recover foreign music publication royalties allegedly owed to him by defendants pursuant to contract dated December 17, 1961 (the 1961 contract). Ellington also sought to commence a class action against defendants on behalf of a putative class consisting of all persons to whom defendants have failed to pay their full contractual share of foreign publication royalties.

Pursuant to the 1961 contract, the First Parties transferred to the Second Party the copyrights to numerous identified musical compositions written by Duke Ellington between 1927 and the contract date, in exchange for, inter alia, payments of cash and royalties, calculated as a percentage of various sources of income, including income generated from sales outside the United States. The 1961 contract superceded a series of similar agreements between Duke Ellington and Mills Music or certain of its affiliates.

There was no real dispute that the 1961 contract is a "net receipts" songwriter royalty agreement. A "net receipts" agreement, common in the music industry prior to the early 1980s, provides for the payment of royalties to the songwriter on a net receipts basis, or, payment based on the net income received by the United States publisher from foreign subpublishers, who retain a percentage of the foreign income as a fee in payment for their services in exploiting and administering publication of the songs outside the United States.

The Court held that the 1961 Contract was clear and unambiguous. ""The royalty payment provision terms demonstrate that the 1961 contract is a net receipts royalty agreement that requires Mills Music, now EMI Mills, to pay Duke Ellington, now Ellington, one half of the 'net revenue actually received by the Second Party' from the 'foreign publication' of the songs falling within the scope of the contract." The Court rejected plaintiff's argument that the 1961 contract was a "at source" agreement, i.e., an agreement for payment of royalties earned worldwide calculated on the amount of income earned in the foreign territories at their source, rather than on the portion of that income received by the United States publisher. In sum, the 1961 contract permited defendants to employ the very method of royalty calculation of which Ellington now complains. Motion to dismiss granted.

Label Fails To State Copyright Claim; Leave To Amend Granted

Tufamerica, Inc. v. The Orchard Enterprises, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-01816 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 18, 2011) [Doc. 16].

Plaintiff is the owner of the record label Tuff City Music Group and owns the rights to thousands of musical recordings and compositions. In September 2006, TufAmerica licensed defendant's predecssor the right to market a large number of musical tracks by way of digital downloads (the “License”). The License obligated defendant's predecessor to pay TufAmerica various types of payments in exchange for digital distribution rights to hundreds of songs. In late 2007, defendant assumed its predecessor's obligations under the License. While TufAmerica received various payments from Digital and Orchard, it never received any payment of mechanical royalties.

Defendant argued that the License preempted plaintiff's copyright case. The Court agreed:

TufAmerica fails to state a facially plausible claim under the Copyright Act because it concedes that its copyright claim is governed by the License, not the Copyright Act. While TufAmerica subsequently argues that the License does not govern mechanical royalties, a “claim for relief ‘may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.’” As a result, Orchard’s motion to dismiss is granted.

Because TufAmerica’s claim under the Copyright Act was dismissed, the court lacked pendent jurisdiction over the New York State common law claim of unjust enrichment.

However, because the License did not unambiguously preempt a claim under the Copyright Act's compulsory license provision, leave to amend the Complaint was granted.

Florida Long Arm Statute Examined In Copyright Case

Wishfire Enterprises, LLC v. Dancing Ferret Discs, Inc. Index No. 4:11-cv-00092-RH-WCS (N.D. Fla. filed 10/12/11) [Doc. 30].

This is a copyright-infringement and breach-of-contract case. The plaintiff The Cruxshadows is a band that records music and has had three number-one hits. The plaintiff Virgil R. Du Pont, III, is the band‟s lead member. T he other plaintiffs are a limited liability company and corporation that market the band's music under a license from the band or its lead member. All are based in Florida. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted and lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court denied the motion.

The defendant Dancing Ferret Discs, Inc., has a record label and distributes music throughout the United States, including in Florida. Dancing Ferret' s principal place of business is in Pennsylvania. Citing Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (2010) and Cable/Home Communications Corp. v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 856-57 (11th Cir. 1990), the Court held that Florida's long-arm statute establishes jurisdiction when a nonresident transmits material into Florida that infringes a Florida resident‟s copyright. "[C]opyright infringement in Florida, though initiated from elsewhere, subjects the infringer to jurisdiction in Florida..."

Karaoke Damages Limited On Per "Work" Basis

Sony/ATV Music Publishing LLC v. D.J. Miller Musict Distributors, Inc. et al., Index No. 3:09-cv-01098 (M.D. Tenn. filed Oct. 5, 2011).

Plaintiffs allege that they are the owners/administrators of music copyrights in numerous original music compositions. Plaintiffs further allege that since at least early 2006, all of the named defendants had been participating in the manufacture, reproduction, distribution, advertising, promotion and offering for sale of illegal and unauthorized copies of Plaintiffs’ music compositions in the form of karaoke recordings in various formats for discs and Internet downloads.

The Defendants argue that Plaintiffs seek damages beyond what is permitted under the Copyright Act because they seek damages on a per infringement basis and not a per work basis. The Defendants allege that Plaintiffs are improperly seeking 1,406 statutory awards because the lists annexed to the complaint of allegedly infringing songs contain many duplicate listings of songs; Defendants argue that, once these duplicate listings are removed, there are only 448 “works” for which Plaintiffs could be able to recover statutory awards.

The Court agreed with Defendants. "The plain language of the Copyright Act indicates that a single statutory award is appropriate for all infringements related to a single copyrighted work". Motion granted.

6th Circuit Rules On Copyright Issue

Severe Records, LLC v. Rich et al., No. 09-6175 (6th Cir. Sep. 23, 2011).

Plaintiff Mark Christopher “Chris” Sevier authored a song entitled “Better.” Defendant Shanna Crooks recorded the song and, because they were pleased with the results, they co-authored and recorded a second song, “Watching Me Leave.” Their relationship then collapsed, Crooks signed as a recording artist with unrelated recording and management companies, and various

accusations and altercations followed, precipitating this action. Sevier and his recording company, Severe Records, LLC (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed suit, alleging what Sevier characterized as a “novel” claim of copyright infringement against Crooks and

others for preventing Plaintiffs from commercially exploiting the two songs through threats contained in cease-and-desist letters and requests to music retailers that the songs not be offered for sale. Plaintiffs also sought a declaratory judgment regarding the authorship of the songs and ownership of the copyrights to the two songs. The district court dismissed the amended complaint for failing to state a claim of copyright infringement and declined to consider Plaintiffs’ pendent state law claims or issue a declaratory judgment. The 6th Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the copyright infringement claim and reversed its dismissal of the

declaratory judgment claim.

There is no allegation anywhere in the amended complaint that Crooks did anything with the musical composition “Better” other than utilize the sound recording that she and Sevier created and that she was admittedly permitted to use for commercial or non-commercial gain. Indeed, Plaintiffs conceded in paragraph 735 of their amended complaint that “[t]he Defendants did not engage in unauthorized copying, but rather, their actions prevented Plaintiffs from copying.” That ends the inquiry; no claim for copyright infringement was properly alleged. Plaintiffs’ allegation that “Crooks attempted to transfer and did transfer an interest in the composition ‘Better’, [sic] which she did not own, to the Rich Defendants” is not the same thing as creating an improper copy of “Better.” We read nothing in the plain language of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106, to suggest that such a transfer constitutes copyright infringement. We expressly decline Plaintiffs’ invitation to grossly expand copyright infringement causes of action to include any acts that create barriers to a copyright holder’s ability to fully exploit that copyright.

Judge Reduces TM Jury Verdict Award To Hendrix

Experience Hendrix, LLC v. Hendrixlicensing.com, Ltd. et al., No. 2:09-cv-00285 (W.D. Wash. filed Sep. 21, 2011) [Doc. 160].

Plaintiffs own various tradmarks incorporating Jimi Hendrix's name, image, signature, song titles and/or lyrics. Defendants used one or more of these federally registered markes on products bearing Hendrix's image or art he created. The case proceeded to trial on three issues: damages for trademark infringement, defendants' liability for violation of Washington's Consumer Protection Act, and upon a finding of liability, actual damages for the consumer protection violation. After trial, the jury deliberated and rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiffs awarding, on the infringement claim, actual damages of $306,650 and defendants' profits of $60,000.

The Court concluded that the evidence, when construed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, permitted only one reasonable conclusion, which was contrary to the jury's verdict concerning lost profits. "Having entirely failed to carry their burden proving expenses, plaintiffs are not entitled, as a matter of law, to an award of lost profits."

The Court further concluded that the jury's awards for injury to reputation and injury to goodwill were contrary to the Court's instructions and unsupported by the evidence.

The Court denied plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees under the Lanham Act in light of defendants' overall success and lack of bad faith. However, Plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys fees under the state consumer protection claim -- which the Court limited to $50,000 (or 10% of the amount requested by Plaintiffs).

Lastly, the Court entered a limited permanent injunction.

Copyright Case Dismissed Against 50 Cent Over Crime Story/Book

Winstead v. Jackson, et al., No. 2:10-cv-05783 (D.N.J. Sept. 20, 2011) [Doc. 45].

In this copyright infringement action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ movie and companion album, both entitled Before I Self Destruct, infringe upon Plaintiff’s copyright in his book, The Preachers Son - But the Streets Turned Me Into a Gangster. Plaintiff is the author and sole owner of the copyright for the Book. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants infringed upon the

copyright of the Book by publishing and selling the Movie and the Album, both of which

Plaintiff contends derive their content from the Book.

The Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff avers that the film duplicates the generalized theme and story

of the book and amounts to actionable copying. "However, general plot ideas and themes lie in

the public domain and are not protected by copyright law." Continuing:

There is no doubt that the Book and Film do share similar characters, themes, as well as a similar setting. However, this s haring of common features is only natural since both works feature a protagonist who has a difficult upbringing and turns to a life of violence and street crime, a story which has long ago been part of the public domain and which has been the subject of numerous movies and television shows. Thus, both works may properly contain gang life in inner-city New Jersey, characters spending time in jail, the search for an ex-girlfriend upon release from prison, making love in the shower, obtaining money through criminal activity, purchasing fancy clothes and accessories with the proceeds of crime, shoot-outs, murder, and the loss of a parent.

The Court further held that commonly used words, phrases and cliches used in both the book and movie/album are not protectable. Also, Plaintiff's state common law claims were pre-empted by the Copyright Act.

Lastly, because the Court held that Defendants did not infringe on Plaintiff’s copyright, Plaintiff’s claims of vicarious and contributory infringement fail since they hinge on a preliminary finding of direct infringement.