Baldwin v. EMI Feist Catalog, 14-182-cv (2d Cir. Oct. 8, 2015).
The Second Circuit held that EMI publishing owned rights to the song "Santa Clause Is Comin' To Town" under a 1981 grant, not a 1951 grant, and accordingly that a 2007 termination notice terminates EMI's interest in 2016, reversing the lower court's entry of summary judgment for EMI. The case details the complex statutory scheme under the 1976 Copyright Act which gave authors and their statutory heirs the right to terminate previously made grants of copyright under certain circumstances, and thereby to recapture some of the value associated with the works. 17 USC 203 and 304(c)-(d). Plaintiff sought a declaration that either a notice of termination served on the publisher in 2007 or another served in 2012, will, upon becoming effective, terminate EMI's rights to the song. The Second Circuit concluded that EMI owned rights to the song not under a 1951 agreement but instead under a subsequent 1981 contract, and that that the 2007 termination notice will terminate the 1981 agreement in 2016. Accordingly, plaintiff (the author's heirs) were entitled to a declaratory judgment.
The Court detailed the various rights of reversion under the Copyright Act, which permits the author of certain earlier works to terminate a grant of copyright (e.g., to a publisher, like EMI's predecessor). It then found that a 1981 Agreement not only granted EMI the future interest scheduled to revert to the author upon termination, it also replaced an earlier 1951 agreement as to the source of EMI's existing rights to the song. Applying New York common law, the Court held that the parties intended for the new contract to substitute for the old one. "Section 1 of the contract shows that they chose not only to have EMI receive the future interest that vested in [the author] upon service of the termination notice, but also to replace the 1951 Agreement as the source of EMI's existing rights in the Song." Thus, the failure to record a 1981 termination notice under the 1951 agreement was irrelevant to the question whether EMI presently owned the copyright in the Song under either agreement. Its rights to the renewal term were traceable to the 1981 agreement. Thus, that was all that matters for decided plaintiffs' termination notices pursuant to section 203.
The Court concluded that Plaintiff could terminate the 1981 agreement under section 203 (section 304 did not control), and that the 2007 termination notice terminated the 1981 agreement. Publication is a one time event that occurred in the 1930s. Because the 1981 grant was executed by the author and does not cover the right of publication, it was terminable under section 203 starting on December 15, 2016, which is the effective date of termination stated in the 2007 notice.
October 9, 2015
Hip Hop Producer Failed To State A Claim Against Her Former Attorneys In An Earlier Copyright Action
Boone v. Codispoti & Assocs., No. 15-cv-01391 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 7, 2015).
The Court held that a hip-hop producer, proceeding pro se, did not state a claim for fraud, conspiracy and denial of due process arising from her former attorney's prior representation in a copyright infringement action. Plaintiff alleged that her former attorneys falsely led her to believe that a jury trial would occur, and to amend her pleadings, knowing that almost all copyright infringement actions do not survive summary judgment. The claim failed because the alleged statements were a mere expression of future expectations that did not constitute actionable fraud. Moreover, the alleged actions were not fraudulent representations or omissions. The claim was also time-barred. Lacking a fraud claim, her conspiracy claim also failed. The due process claim, under 42 USC 1983, failed because there was no statement of a constitutional violation. The summary judgment decision dismissing her earlier case was affirmed on appeal. Nor did defendants act under color of state law. The defendants were private attorneys who represented plaintiff in federal court in a copyright action. Leave to amend was denied, and the complaint was dismissed.
The Court held that a hip-hop producer, proceeding pro se, did not state a claim for fraud, conspiracy and denial of due process arising from her former attorney's prior representation in a copyright infringement action. Plaintiff alleged that her former attorneys falsely led her to believe that a jury trial would occur, and to amend her pleadings, knowing that almost all copyright infringement actions do not survive summary judgment. The claim failed because the alleged statements were a mere expression of future expectations that did not constitute actionable fraud. Moreover, the alleged actions were not fraudulent representations or omissions. The claim was also time-barred. Lacking a fraud claim, her conspiracy claim also failed. The due process claim, under 42 USC 1983, failed because there was no statement of a constitutional violation. The summary judgment decision dismissing her earlier case was affirmed on appeal. Nor did defendants act under color of state law. The defendants were private attorneys who represented plaintiff in federal court in a copyright action. Leave to amend was denied, and the complaint was dismissed.
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