Blue Sphere, Inc. v. Swift et al., No. 8:14-cv-00782-CJC-DFM (C.D. Cak. filed 08/04/15) [Doc. 65].
Despite her world tour, and claims that she has no knowledge about Plaintiff's claims, Taylor Swift must be deposed in a trademark action. The Court denied her motion for a protective order, finding that that, notwithstanding the "apex doctrine" that protects high-level corporate executives from harassing depositions, "the extraordinary circumstances that would warrant a pr otective order prohibiting the deposition of a named party are not present here." Further, Swifts schedule -- including her world tour -- was not a basis for a protective order. "There is no evidence in the record to show that Plai ntiffs have been inconsiderate of Swift’s schedule. To the contrary, the record shows just the opposi te. Nor does the evidence suggest that Plaintiffs have sandbagged Swift’s deposition to coincide with her world tour; instead, the record shows that, as in most cases, most deposi tions have been left until the end of the discovery period."
August 6, 2015
August 3, 2015
Ray Charles' Foundation Can Challenge Notices His Heirs Served To Terminate Copyright Grants To The Foundation
The Ray Charles Foundation v. Robinson, No. 13-55421 (9th Cir. Opinion dated July 31, 2015).
The 9th Circuit holds that that the Ray Charles Foundation, the sole beneficiary of Ray Charles’s estate, had standing to challenge the validity and effectiveness of notices of termination of copyright grants conferred by Charles to the predecessors of Warnter/Chappell Music. The Court found that the Foundation was a real party in interest because the termination notices affected its right to royalties, and its claims fell within the statutory zone of interests. Accordingly, it had standing to sue to challenge whether the underlying works were made for hire and thus not subject to the termination provisions of 17 USC 203 and 304(c).
The 9th Circuit holds that that the Ray Charles Foundation, the sole beneficiary of Ray Charles’s estate, had standing to challenge the validity and effectiveness of notices of termination of copyright grants conferred by Charles to the predecessors of Warnter/Chappell Music. The Court found that the Foundation was a real party in interest because the termination notices affected its right to royalties, and its claims fell within the statutory zone of interests. Accordingly, it had standing to sue to challenge whether the underlying works were made for hire and thus not subject to the termination provisions of 17 USC 203 and 304(c).
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