Ford v. Ray, No. 15-0432 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 27, 2015).
After dismissing plaintiff's copyright claim and granting Sir-Mix-A-Lot attorneys fees under 17 USC 505, the Court awarded defendant $20,000 in fees. The amount awarded was a reduction from the approximately $58,000 sought, based on partially redacted and duplicative time-sheets and avoiding putting the plaintiff in financial ruin.
October 28, 2015
October 27, 2015
Beyonce Dodges Copyright Claim In "XO" v "XOXO" Case
Lane v. Carter et al., No. 14-cv-6798 (SDNY filed 10/21/15) [Doc. 51].
Plaintiff's claim, alleging that he gave a copy of his song XOXO to one of Beyonce's background singers and that Beyonce infringed the song when she created the song XO, was dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and 8(a). First, the Court found that although Plaintiff holds a copyright registration for the lyrics to XOXO, the registration excluded rights to the music which was the sole basis of the copyright claim. Moreover, even though Plaintiff alleged that he was an exclusive licensee, he did not allege that hte licensor had a valdily registred copyright. Accordingly, the claim was dismissed for lack of standing.
Even though that was potentially curable on an amended pleading, the Court found then considered whether a copyright infringement claim was otherwise substantively viable. The Court then underwent a "substantial similarity" analysis of: (1) "the beat" and the songs to determine whether the similarities between the two songs concern copyrightable parts of XOXO and whether a reasonable and properly instructed jury could conclude that there is substantial similarity. The Court found that the use in both songs of "a common four-bar phrase" would not establish substantial similarity between them. Additionally, comparing the songs holistically, the Court found that no reasonable jury could find the lyrics of XOXO substantially similar to XO. Aside from thef act that both songs' lyrics use the letters X and O, "there is virtually nothing common to the two song's lyrics" (emphasis in original). Moreover, the lryics of the two songs have no word in common, save ubiquitous words like "I," "you," your," "is," and "baby." The themes were also different. Next, as to the music, the Court listened to the two song and found litte, if anything, in common. The Court, accordingly, dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
Plaintiff's claim, alleging that he gave a copy of his song XOXO to one of Beyonce's background singers and that Beyonce infringed the song when she created the song XO, was dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and 8(a). First, the Court found that although Plaintiff holds a copyright registration for the lyrics to XOXO, the registration excluded rights to the music which was the sole basis of the copyright claim. Moreover, even though Plaintiff alleged that he was an exclusive licensee, he did not allege that hte licensor had a valdily registred copyright. Accordingly, the claim was dismissed for lack of standing.
Even though that was potentially curable on an amended pleading, the Court found then considered whether a copyright infringement claim was otherwise substantively viable. The Court then underwent a "substantial similarity" analysis of: (1) "the beat" and the songs to determine whether the similarities between the two songs concern copyrightable parts of XOXO and whether a reasonable and properly instructed jury could conclude that there is substantial similarity. The Court found that the use in both songs of "a common four-bar phrase" would not establish substantial similarity between them. Additionally, comparing the songs holistically, the Court found that no reasonable jury could find the lyrics of XOXO substantially similar to XO. Aside from thef act that both songs' lyrics use the letters X and O, "there is virtually nothing common to the two song's lyrics" (emphasis in original). Moreover, the lryics of the two songs have no word in common, save ubiquitous words like "I," "you," your," "is," and "baby." The themes were also different. Next, as to the music, the Court listened to the two song and found litte, if anything, in common. The Court, accordingly, dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
October 26, 2015
Pandora Pre-1972 Suit Settles
Various news outlets report that the Pandora pre-1972 sound recording litigation has settled for $90 million.
October 21, 2015
Plaintiffs In Sampling Case Fail To Sufficiently Plead Their Standing
Kelley v. The Universal Music Group, No. 14-cv-2968 (S.D.N.Y.
filed 10/19/15).
In a case alleging that a song by the artist "Fabulous"
infringed plaintiffs' 1974 song by including an unauthorized sample, the Court
dismissed the pro se plaintiffs' copyright claim without prejudice to amend
based on their lack of standing. The Court found that a copyright registration
listing the plaintiffs as authors but not claimants rebutted their claim; but,
that plaintiffs could replead to allege that they have standing as "beneficial
owners" (i.e. a right to collect royalties), which was not sufficiently pleaded. The other state-law claims for violation of
"poetic license " and "fraudulent deceit" were held to be
preempted by the copyright act, and the mental anguish claim was not a remedy
authorized by the statute.
October 9, 2015
Santa Clause Is Comin To Town Reverts To Author's Heirs In 2016
Baldwin v. EMI Feist Catalog, 14-182-cv (2d Cir. Oct. 8, 2015).
The Second Circuit held that EMI publishing owned rights to the song "Santa Clause Is Comin' To Town" under a 1981 grant, not a 1951 grant, and accordingly that a 2007 termination notice terminates EMI's interest in 2016, reversing the lower court's entry of summary judgment for EMI. The case details the complex statutory scheme under the 1976 Copyright Act which gave authors and their statutory heirs the right to terminate previously made grants of copyright under certain circumstances, and thereby to recapture some of the value associated with the works. 17 USC 203 and 304(c)-(d). Plaintiff sought a declaration that either a notice of termination served on the publisher in 2007 or another served in 2012, will, upon becoming effective, terminate EMI's rights to the song. The Second Circuit concluded that EMI owned rights to the song not under a 1951 agreement but instead under a subsequent 1981 contract, and that that the 2007 termination notice will terminate the 1981 agreement in 2016. Accordingly, plaintiff (the author's heirs) were entitled to a declaratory judgment.
The Court detailed the various rights of reversion under the Copyright Act, which permits the author of certain earlier works to terminate a grant of copyright (e.g., to a publisher, like EMI's predecessor). It then found that a 1981 Agreement not only granted EMI the future interest scheduled to revert to the author upon termination, it also replaced an earlier 1951 agreement as to the source of EMI's existing rights to the song. Applying New York common law, the Court held that the parties intended for the new contract to substitute for the old one. "Section 1 of the contract shows that they chose not only to have EMI receive the future interest that vested in [the author] upon service of the termination notice, but also to replace the 1951 Agreement as the source of EMI's existing rights in the Song." Thus, the failure to record a 1981 termination notice under the 1951 agreement was irrelevant to the question whether EMI presently owned the copyright in the Song under either agreement. Its rights to the renewal term were traceable to the 1981 agreement. Thus, that was all that matters for decided plaintiffs' termination notices pursuant to section 203.
The Court concluded that Plaintiff could terminate the 1981 agreement under section 203 (section 304 did not control), and that the 2007 termination notice terminated the 1981 agreement. Publication is a one time event that occurred in the 1930s. Because the 1981 grant was executed by the author and does not cover the right of publication, it was terminable under section 203 starting on December 15, 2016, which is the effective date of termination stated in the 2007 notice.
The Second Circuit held that EMI publishing owned rights to the song "Santa Clause Is Comin' To Town" under a 1981 grant, not a 1951 grant, and accordingly that a 2007 termination notice terminates EMI's interest in 2016, reversing the lower court's entry of summary judgment for EMI. The case details the complex statutory scheme under the 1976 Copyright Act which gave authors and their statutory heirs the right to terminate previously made grants of copyright under certain circumstances, and thereby to recapture some of the value associated with the works. 17 USC 203 and 304(c)-(d). Plaintiff sought a declaration that either a notice of termination served on the publisher in 2007 or another served in 2012, will, upon becoming effective, terminate EMI's rights to the song. The Second Circuit concluded that EMI owned rights to the song not under a 1951 agreement but instead under a subsequent 1981 contract, and that that the 2007 termination notice will terminate the 1981 agreement in 2016. Accordingly, plaintiff (the author's heirs) were entitled to a declaratory judgment.
The Court detailed the various rights of reversion under the Copyright Act, which permits the author of certain earlier works to terminate a grant of copyright (e.g., to a publisher, like EMI's predecessor). It then found that a 1981 Agreement not only granted EMI the future interest scheduled to revert to the author upon termination, it also replaced an earlier 1951 agreement as to the source of EMI's existing rights to the song. Applying New York common law, the Court held that the parties intended for the new contract to substitute for the old one. "Section 1 of the contract shows that they chose not only to have EMI receive the future interest that vested in [the author] upon service of the termination notice, but also to replace the 1951 Agreement as the source of EMI's existing rights in the Song." Thus, the failure to record a 1981 termination notice under the 1951 agreement was irrelevant to the question whether EMI presently owned the copyright in the Song under either agreement. Its rights to the renewal term were traceable to the 1981 agreement. Thus, that was all that matters for decided plaintiffs' termination notices pursuant to section 203.
The Court concluded that Plaintiff could terminate the 1981 agreement under section 203 (section 304 did not control), and that the 2007 termination notice terminated the 1981 agreement. Publication is a one time event that occurred in the 1930s. Because the 1981 grant was executed by the author and does not cover the right of publication, it was terminable under section 203 starting on December 15, 2016, which is the effective date of termination stated in the 2007 notice.
Hip Hop Producer Failed To State A Claim Against Her Former Attorneys In An Earlier Copyright Action
Boone v. Codispoti & Assocs., No. 15-cv-01391 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 7, 2015).
The Court held that a hip-hop producer, proceeding pro se, did not state a claim for fraud, conspiracy and denial of due process arising from her former attorney's prior representation in a copyright infringement action. Plaintiff alleged that her former attorneys falsely led her to believe that a jury trial would occur, and to amend her pleadings, knowing that almost all copyright infringement actions do not survive summary judgment. The claim failed because the alleged statements were a mere expression of future expectations that did not constitute actionable fraud. Moreover, the alleged actions were not fraudulent representations or omissions. The claim was also time-barred. Lacking a fraud claim, her conspiracy claim also failed. The due process claim, under 42 USC 1983, failed because there was no statement of a constitutional violation. The summary judgment decision dismissing her earlier case was affirmed on appeal. Nor did defendants act under color of state law. The defendants were private attorneys who represented plaintiff in federal court in a copyright action. Leave to amend was denied, and the complaint was dismissed.
The Court held that a hip-hop producer, proceeding pro se, did not state a claim for fraud, conspiracy and denial of due process arising from her former attorney's prior representation in a copyright infringement action. Plaintiff alleged that her former attorneys falsely led her to believe that a jury trial would occur, and to amend her pleadings, knowing that almost all copyright infringement actions do not survive summary judgment. The claim failed because the alleged statements were a mere expression of future expectations that did not constitute actionable fraud. Moreover, the alleged actions were not fraudulent representations or omissions. The claim was also time-barred. Lacking a fraud claim, her conspiracy claim also failed. The due process claim, under 42 USC 1983, failed because there was no statement of a constitutional violation. The summary judgment decision dismissing her earlier case was affirmed on appeal. Nor did defendants act under color of state law. The defendants were private attorneys who represented plaintiff in federal court in a copyright action. Leave to amend was denied, and the complaint was dismissed.
October 1, 2015
Kanye, Jay-Z and Others Avoid Copyright Infringement Claim Because Two "Made In America" Songs Not Substantially Similar
McDonald v. West et al., No. 14-cv-8794 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2015) [Doc. 42].
In case about two songs both called "Made In America," the Court dismissed the Complaint against Kanye West, Jay-Z and others alleging copyright infringement of the plaintiff's song, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). First, the Court found that even though the two songs shared the same title, the song title "Made In America" was not copyrightable. "It is too brief, common, and unoriginal to create any exclusive right." Second, the Court analyzed similarity between the lyrics in the chorus of each song, along with alleged musical similarity. However, the Court found that plaintiff did not plausibly plead substantial similarity. The Court then turned to a "holistic" comparison of the two songs, because even if the indvidual elements that make up Plaintiff's songs are uncopyrightable, they still may represent a protected selection and arrangement of unprotectable elements. The Court found that no reasonable jury could find the two songs similar, lyrically or musically. The differences were major. "Where any reasonable juror would conclude - as here - that the differences are many, and what similarities exist are based on unprotectable elements, the two works are not substantially similar as a matter of law." Accordingly, the Court dismissed the complaint.
In case about two songs both called "Made In America," the Court dismissed the Complaint against Kanye West, Jay-Z and others alleging copyright infringement of the plaintiff's song, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). First, the Court found that even though the two songs shared the same title, the song title "Made In America" was not copyrightable. "It is too brief, common, and unoriginal to create any exclusive right." Second, the Court analyzed similarity between the lyrics in the chorus of each song, along with alleged musical similarity. However, the Court found that plaintiff did not plausibly plead substantial similarity. The Court then turned to a "holistic" comparison of the two songs, because even if the indvidual elements that make up Plaintiff's songs are uncopyrightable, they still may represent a protected selection and arrangement of unprotectable elements. The Court found that no reasonable jury could find the two songs similar, lyrically or musically. The differences were major. "Where any reasonable juror would conclude - as here - that the differences are many, and what similarities exist are based on unprotectable elements, the two works are not substantially similar as a matter of law." Accordingly, the Court dismissed the complaint.
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