Alticor Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., No. 6:14-cv-542 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2015).
In a complex dispute between mutliple record companies and Amway concerning alleged direct, vicarious and contributory infringement of pre- and post-'72 sound recordings in over 1,000 videos, the Court dismissed Amway's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the record companies counter-claims. First, the Court found that the record companies had adequately alleged violations of their exclusive right of public performance. Amway argued that the "public performance right" applicable to musical compositions and other works was inapplicable to sound recordings; the Court rejected that argument. Second, the Court found that even though the Copyright Act does not conver a "making available" right, the act of making a work available for use of a direct infringer was relevant to the record companies' indirect infringement claims. Third, the Court agreed with Amway that Florida common law does not create a public performance right for pre-72 recordings, but nonetheless held that it would not grant Amway partial relief under Rule 12(b)(6).
Showing posts with label Florida. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Florida. Show all posts
December 30, 2015
June 23, 2015
Florida Court Rejects Pre-72 Sound Recording Rights in Turtles/Sirius Case; Contrary To NY and CA Decisions
Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. SiriusXM, No. 13-23182-CIV-GAYLES/TURNOFF (S.D. Fla. dated June 22, 2015).
A Florida federal court granted defendant Sirius summary judgment as to liability on plaintiff Flo & Eddie's (the Turtle's) common-law copyright infringement claims, although New York and California courts have found differently. The Florida federal court observed that Florida is different from New York and California, inasmuch as as there is no Florida legislation covering sound recordings nor is there a bevy of case law interpreting common law copyright related to the arts. "The Court finds that the issue of whether copyright protection for pre- 1972 rec ordings should include the exclusive right to public performance is for the Florida legislature." Accordingly, the Court found that Florida common law did not provie plaintiff with the exclusive right of public performance in the Turtles' sound recordings. Further, the Court found that back-up and buffer copies made by Sirius were not unlawful reproductions. Because the Court found that Sirius had not infringed any of Plaintiff's copyrights, the Court also dismissed plaintiff's related claims for unfair competition, conversion and civil theft (all of which were based on alleged copyright infiringement).
A Florida federal court granted defendant Sirius summary judgment as to liability on plaintiff Flo & Eddie's (the Turtle's) common-law copyright infringement claims, although New York and California courts have found differently. The Florida federal court observed that Florida is different from New York and California, inasmuch as as there is no Florida legislation covering sound recordings nor is there a bevy of case law interpreting common law copyright related to the arts. "The Court finds that the issue of whether copyright protection for pre- 1972 rec ordings should include the exclusive right to public performance is for the Florida legislature." Accordingly, the Court found that Florida common law did not provie plaintiff with the exclusive right of public performance in the Turtles' sound recordings. Further, the Court found that back-up and buffer copies made by Sirius were not unlawful reproductions. Because the Court found that Sirius had not infringed any of Plaintiff's copyrights, the Court also dismissed plaintiff's related claims for unfair competition, conversion and civil theft (all of which were based on alleged copyright infiringement).
March 27, 2013
KC/Sunshine Case Dismissed For Lack Of Standing
Smith v Casey, No. 1:12-cv-23795 (S.D. Fla. 3/21/2013) [Doc. 71].
Plaintiff was the administer of an estate of a recording artist, songwriter, producer, and musician who died in 2012. The decedent was the sole author of the musical composition entitled Spank. Plaintiff alleged that, “[d]espite receipt of Decedent Smith’s Cease and Desist notice Defendants KC, Harrick Music, Sunshine Sound, Horne and Joy Productions have continued to commercially exploit the Composition ‘Spank.’ Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint was for copyright infringement of the Spank composition only, and only for the period from November 28, 2011, when the Cease & Desist Letter was written, through the present.
Defendants moved to dismiss the copyright claims against them on either of two separate grounds: (1) Plaintiff lacks standing to sue for copyright infringement, given that he never registered his copyright interest; and (2) the Complaint contains insufficient allegations of infringement activity. The Court agreed that the copyright infringement count should be dismissed for all Defendants because Plaintiff lacked standing to sue, and additionally as to the moving Defendants because of insufficient pleadings.
Plaintiff was the administer of an estate of a recording artist, songwriter, producer, and musician who died in 2012. The decedent was the sole author of the musical composition entitled Spank. Plaintiff alleged that, “[d]espite receipt of Decedent Smith’s Cease and Desist notice Defendants KC, Harrick Music, Sunshine Sound, Horne and Joy Productions have continued to commercially exploit the Composition ‘Spank.’ Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint was for copyright infringement of the Spank composition only, and only for the period from November 28, 2011, when the Cease & Desist Letter was written, through the present.
Defendants moved to dismiss the copyright claims against them on either of two separate grounds: (1) Plaintiff lacks standing to sue for copyright infringement, given that he never registered his copyright interest; and (2) the Complaint contains insufficient allegations of infringement activity. The Court agreed that the copyright infringement count should be dismissed for all Defendants because Plaintiff lacked standing to sue, and additionally as to the moving Defendants because of insufficient pleadings.
Standing to sue for infringement must necessarily be grounded in ownership of a copyright
interest. That ownership is determined in part by compliance with the formalities of the
Copyright Act. The Act provides that “[t]he legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under
a copyright is entitled, subject to the requirements of section 411, to institute an action for any
infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it.” 17 U.S.C.
§ 501(b). Section 411, in turn, states that “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in
any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright
claim has been made in accordance with this title.” Id. § 411(a). Any registration for the
copyright sued upon must be commenced no later than the date that the suit was brought. If Plaintiff produces a certificate of copyright, the burden shifts to Defendants to demonstrate why the claim of copyright is invalid.
Here, Plaintiff has failed to produce a certificate of copyright with respect to the Spank
composition, and fails even to allege that it had registered for one by the time this Complaint was filed. Plaintiff does attach a Certificate of Copyright Registration, dated March 1, 1979, for
Spank to the Complaint, but the Certificate names Harrick Music as the Copyright Claimant.
Smith is listed only as the author, and the Registration notes that “Harrick Music, Inc. received transfer by written notice from Ronald Luis Smith.” Even if the registration were the fruit of inaccurate information submitted by the registrant, Harrick Music, it is still a prerequisite to the filing of a copyright infringement claim – a prerequisite that neither Plaintiff nor Smith has satisfied. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring Count I against any and all of the defendants, including Horne and Joy Productions. [Internal citations omitted].
Labels:
Copyright,
Copyright Act,
Florida,
Infringement,
Registration,
Standing
October 17, 2011
Florida Long Arm Statute Examined In Copyright Case
Wishfire Enterprises, LLC v. Dancing Ferret Discs, Inc. Index No. 4:11-cv-00092-RH-WCS (N.D. Fla. filed 10/12/11) [Doc. 30].
This is a copyright-infringement and breach-of-contract case. The plaintiff The Cruxshadows is a band that records music and has had three number-one hits. The plaintiff Virgil R. Du Pont, III, is the band‟s lead member. T he other plaintiffs are a limited liability company and corporation that market the band's music under a license from the band or its lead member. All are based in Florida. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted and lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court denied the motion.
The defendant Dancing Ferret Discs, Inc., has a record label and distributes music throughout the United States, including in Florida. Dancing Ferret' s principal place of business is in Pennsylvania. Citing Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (2010) and Cable/Home Communications Corp. v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 856-57 (11th Cir. 1990), the Court held that Florida's long-arm statute establishes jurisdiction when a nonresident transmits material into Florida that infringes a Florida resident‟s copyright. "[C]opyright infringement in Florida, though initiated from elsewhere, subjects the infringer to jurisdiction in Florida..."
March 7, 2011
Spanish Language Adapter Loses Suit Against Coke
Vergara Hermosilla v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 10-21418 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 23, 2011). Decision here.
Plaintiff was hired by Coca Cola to adapt a song into Spanish. Plaintiff requested an "adapter's share." During a telephone call with defendant, Plaintiff agreed to relinquish any copyright interest in the work. In an email later that day, Plaintiff wrote "For the adaptation, you may consider it a work for hire with no economic compensation to that respect. I believe what's legal is a dollar."
The Court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Relying on section 204 of the Copyright Act, the Court held that Plaintiff's copyright interest -- the adapted lyrics -- was conveyed by a signed writing (the email). An irrevocable agreement was reached, so that later communications between the parties concerning a written contract that differed from the parties' agreement did not alter the parties' actual agreement. "Therefore, because Coca Cola cannot be sued based on a copyright interest it owns, Coca Cola is entitled to summary judgment on all counts."
April 7, 2008
Oh, Nelly!
Juan Antonio Castro Rios p/k/a/ Tony Tun Tun v. Coalition Music, LLC et. al, No. 1:08-cv-20922-AJ (S.D.Fla filed Apr. 4, 2008).
Allegations:
Plaintiff wrote a song ("Hagamos el Amor"), brought the song to Nelly, and the two worked together to edit the musical arrangement of the original composition. English lyrics were written to a portion of the composition, and plaintiff recorded and produced the vocals.
Nelly retained copies of the recordings, and the composition appeared on "The Perfect Melody", performed by the artist Zion and produced by Nelly. Neither Zion or Nelly (or any other party) obtained licenses or consent for use of the composition.
The liner notes to "The Perfect Melody" falsely state that Zion is the sole songwriter of the composition, though it is noted that plaintiff is featured in the performance.
Therefore, plaintiff seeks declaratory relief as to the various parties' ownership percentage in the composition. Also, plaintiff alleges fraud by Nelly, unjust enrichment against all defendants, and seeks an accounting.
Interestingly, plaintiff's last count is for copyright infringement -- defendant's composition "is an unauthorized and illegal derivative work of the original composition".
[Request copy of the complaint]
Allegations:
Plaintiff wrote a song ("Hagamos el Amor"), brought the song to Nelly, and the two worked together to edit the musical arrangement of the original composition. English lyrics were written to a portion of the composition, and plaintiff recorded and produced the vocals.
Nelly retained copies of the recordings, and the composition appeared on "The Perfect Melody", performed by the artist Zion and produced by Nelly. Neither Zion or Nelly (or any other party) obtained licenses or consent for use of the composition.
The liner notes to "The Perfect Melody" falsely state that Zion is the sole songwriter of the composition, though it is noted that plaintiff is featured in the performance.
Therefore, plaintiff seeks declaratory relief as to the various parties' ownership percentage in the composition. Also, plaintiff alleges fraud by Nelly, unjust enrichment against all defendants, and seeks an accounting.
Interestingly, plaintiff's last count is for copyright infringement -- defendant's composition "is an unauthorized and illegal derivative work of the original composition".
[Request copy of the complaint]
January 14, 2008
Alleged Infringement - Ft. Lauderdale Bar
A cookie-cutter complaint for alleged infringement of the public performance right to 8 copyrighted compositions by a Fort Lauderdale "place of business for public entertainment, accommodation, amusement and refreshment" was filed in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida. Plaintiffs - music publishers - allege knowledge and intent based on Defendants' failure to seek or obtain an ASCAP license.
This looks like a juke-box case. The involved compositions include "In Da Club" (50 Cent), "You Give Love a Bad Name" (Bon Jovi), and "Back in Black" (AC/DC).
[Sweet Chin Music et al. v. Art Bar of Fort Lauderdale, LLC; case 0:08:-cv-60044-DTKH; filed Jan. 11, 2008]
This looks like a juke-box case. The involved compositions include "In Da Club" (50 Cent), "You Give Love a Bad Name" (Bon Jovi), and "Back in Black" (AC/DC).
[Sweet Chin Music et al. v. Art Bar of Fort Lauderdale, LLC; case 0:08:-cv-60044-DTKH; filed Jan. 11, 2008]
Labels:
Copyright,
Florida,
Infringement,
Public Performance
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